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ABSTRACT 
Four decades of the EU's group-to-group dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean grouping of 
countries and with ASEAN have produced different dynamics and outcomes, despite the EU’s common 
strategy to use economic soft power to achieve their goals for the partnerships. Diverging conditions in 
the two regions created inconsistency in the EU's application of the common approach. The EU's 
neighbourhood security concerns forced it to relax its political stand with their Southern 
Mediterranean partners. For ASEAN, geographical distance dilutes the EU’s security concerns it that 
region and has afforded the EU to be more ideological and assertive on democracy and human rights 
practices. These issues have provoked disagreements in EU-ASEAN dialogues, but both sides have also 
tried to remain pragmatic in order to achieve some progress in the partnership. In contrast, the 
protracted the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to hamper the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, resulting in 
little progress. Social upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean also brought their partnership to a 
standstill. The EU's cooperation with former authoritarian regimes like Libya and Syria have only caused 
damage to its credibility in the Southern Mediterranean, and future Euro-Mediterranean dialogues are 
likely to be affected by it. 
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THE EU'S GROUP-TO-GROUP DIALOGUE WITH THE 
SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND ASEAN – HOW 
MUCH HAVE THEY ACHIEVED? A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 
HONG WAI MUNa 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
By the late 1960s, the European Economic 
Community (EEC) has emerged from the 
destruction of World War II to become an 
economic powerhouse, when its trade deficit with 
the United States (US), the world's largest economy, 
ended. When the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the 1970s 
escalated and precipitated the oil crisis, economic 
conditions in the US worsened. The EEC foresaw 
the US's plans to slow its imports in an attempt to 
reduce its chronic trade deficit and to compete 
more effectively with Europe in exports. This 
forced the EEC to shift its dependence on the US 
and to diversify its export market. Spotting 
opportunities in the newly independent states, the 
EEC launched initiatives to engage its 
Mediterranean neighbors in 1972, followed by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
late 1970s, and with Latin American and Caribbean 
countries a decade later. 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the EEC was 
seen as an economic power and an important aid 
donor to developing economies. The EEC's 
motivation to engage with the developing regional 
partners was initially underpinned by economic 
and developmental rationale. However, when the 
Cold War ended, and the transformation of the EEC 
taking place with the Maastricht Treaty coming into 
force, the European Union (EU)1 saw the need to 
                                                        
a Associate Researcher, MERIGG, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid; 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Project Mediterranean Institute 
Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
1 The six founders of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
under the 1958 Treaty of Rome include Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, 
France, the Netherlands and West Germany. 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
gave rise to the European Union (EU) that involved an enlarged EEC 
whose additional members include Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom in the 1970s, and Greece, Portugal and Spain 
thereafter. In the paper, when discussing pre-1992 events, author 
would use EC, and EU thereafter. 
extend its external relations policy to include the 
political dimension. The collapse of the Soviet bloc 
at the end of the 1980s gave rise to hopes for the 
triumph of “Western liberal” values and boosted 
the EU's confidence in asserting its socio-political 
principles as normative tenets, and began 
emphasizing democracy and human rights in its 
dialogues. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis also 
rendered an opportunity for the EU to pressure 
ASEAN to reform and to pursue greater 
institutionalization to achieve sustainable 
development and good governance. 
 
However, the 9/11 attacks on the US instantly 
raised the EU's concern with terrorism and regional 
security. In response to the heightened security 
agenda, the EU adopted a more mellowed tone 
and strategy to engender closer cooperation with 
their Southern Mediterranean partners on counter-
terrorism. As geographical distance from the EU 
meant that it was not a region of high security 
concern to the Europeans, ASEAN continued to 
experience pressure from the EU on democracy 
and human rights. This situation however only last 
until the euro zone crisis which dampened the EU’s 
normative zeal as its integration model began to 
reveal flaws that curtailed its influence and 
weakened its image as a formidable economic 
power. To revive its economic health and boost 
growth, the EU has begun to take a more geo-
economic approach to courting the emerging 
economies in Southeast Asia. 
 
Against this background, this working paper traces 
the developments in the EU’s dialogues with the 
Southern Mediterranean countries 2  and with 
                                                        
2 According to the definition of the Union for the Mediterranean, 
the Southern Mediterranean is made up of Albania, Algeria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey. However, in the context of this paper, Southern 
Mediterranean refers only to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. It is helpful to highlight that 
the term “Southern Mediterranean” had undergone several 
redefinitions due to the European Community (EC) enlargement. In 
1972, the EC launched the Global Mediterranean Policy, in which 
Southern Mediterranean included Greece that joined the EC in 
1982, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. Malta and Cyprus joined the 
European Union (EU) - as the EC was renamed after the Maastrict 
Treaty came into force in 1992 - in 2004 were included in the 
Renovated Mediterranean Policy launched in 1992. Albania, Bosnia 
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ASEAN3. The motivation behind the comparative 
analysis of these two group-to-group dialogues is 
to investigate why, despite the EU's purported 
common approach, has produced diverse 
outcomes. The  comparative analysis between the 
Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN is made all 
the more interesting  in view of similar 
characteristics that the two regions share: (1) the 
European colonial influence; (2) economic 
dependence on their former European colonizers; 
(3) similar levels of economic development; (4), 
their sensitivities towards sovereignty issues, and 
any perceived interference in domestic affairs, 
likely a result of their colonization; and (5) since 
gaining independence, countries in both regions 
have developed political regimes and practices that 
do not necessarily conform to the EU's democratic 
ideology and socio-political values that prize 
freedom  and human rights. 
 
Despite the EU's use of a common economic soft 
power strategy to engage the Southern 
Mediterranean and ASEAN, the outcomes have 
been quite different. The EU's engagement strategy 
has been based on a set of economic objectives to 
strengthen economic integration and foster shared 
prosperity, and political goals to establish peace 
through the spread of democratic and human 
rights values. However, different conditions 
experienced in the two regions gave rise to the 
EU's inconsistency in attitude and actual 
approaches to these two regions. What this paper 
therefore attempts to do is to analyze how global 
developments interacted with regional and internal 
dynamics, to impact the two group-to-group 
dialogue framework. It is interesting to examine 
the impact of changing global events on the 
partnerships and the shifts in the EU's application 
of its economic soft power approach toward its 
partners, resulting in different outcomes of the 
dialogues' process. 
 
 
                                                                                                
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Turkey are excluded because 
they are official and potential candidates for EU membership. As 
Mauritania is not a Mediterranean riparian state, it is also excluded. 
3 The members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
1. Democracy and human rights versus 
security 
 
The four decades of the EU's group-to-group 
dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean and 
with ASEAN were underpinned by economic 
rationale. In the first two decades, the EU was seen 
primarily as a development cooperation partner. 
Then, the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 
1990s boosted the EU's confidence to establish 
itself as a normative power in the socio-political 
arena. This event also primed the EU to play a 
more active role in global politics beyond that of 
just an economic power. Unlike before, the EU 
proactively used the incentives of economic gains 
to motivate cooperation from its dialogue partners 
in the adoption of the EU’s socio-political values on 
democracy and human rights. 
 
Since the 1990s, democracy and human rights have 
become a feature of the EU's political dialogue 
with the Southern Mediterranean and with ASEAN. 
Democracy and human rights are sensitive and 
contentious issues for both regional partners, and 
political elites in these regions reacted to pressures 
on these issues as a form of neo-colonialism and 
interference with domestic affairs. At the same 
time they were often forced to concede to the EU's 
demands in exchange for financial aid and 
economic support. The difference in the EU's socio-
political priorities and expectations of the two 
partnerships meant that in theory, though a 
common approach to group-to-group dialogue was 
envisaged, this was not usually the case in reality. 
This resulted in different dynamics and outcomes 
of the two group-to-group dialogues. 
 
1.1. When neighborhood security is more 
important 
 
Their geographical proximity meant that the EU has 
regarded the Southern Mediterranean grouping of 
countries as a strategic security partner in 
maintaining regional stability. The EU's 
preoccupation with security heightened after the 
9/11 attacks in New York. A predominantly Arab-
Muslim Southern Mediterranean region and a 
wave of immigrants from that region have 
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provoked anxiety in European societies. One 
rationale behind the EU’s economic development 
strategy in the Southern Mediterranean has been 
to reduce immigration to Europe. The EU saw 
cooperation with authoritarian Southern 
Mediterranean governments as necessary to 
achieve this objective. The EU supported 
development with financial aid programmes to 
help Southern Mediterranean governments 
manage the movement of people (Bayoumi, 2007 
cited in Jaulin, 2010: 5). The Southern 
Mediterranean is also the transiting point for Sub-
Saharan immigrants (Jaulin 2010: 7); coupled with 
threats of Islamic extremism spreading across the 
region, cooperation on human movement became 
a priority for the EU. The EU was therefore unfazed 
by prioritizing security above democracy and 
human rights in its cooperation with authoritarian 
states in the Southern Mediterranean. 
 
Security was a key priority in all subsequent Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Meetings, and a 
counter-terrorism cooperation clause was included 
in all Association Agreements with Southern 
Mediterranean states (Menéndes and Young, 2006). 
In assessing a decade of Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, Aliboni (2009) asserted that the EU 
has not imposed any democracy-related 
conditionality on the Southern Mediterranean 
states. Despite authoritarian practices in several 
Southern Mediterranean states, financial aid was 
not withdrawn and economic relations were not 
disrupted. Taking advantage of the EU's 
preoccupation with security, the Southern 
Mediterranean partners were able to continue 
with authoritarian practices to consolidate power 
on the pretext of maintaining order and stability. 
 
The EU's security strategy became unsustainable 
when social uprisings swept across the Southern 
Mediterranean in December 2010, leading to the 
toppling of two long-time authoritarian leaders, 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni 
Mubarak of Egypt. These events brought Euro-
Mediterranean partnership to its demise (Behr, 
2012: 76). The EU was criticized for cooperating 
with former authoritarian regimes, and this 
damaged its credibility among the citizens of the 
Southern Mediterranean. The EU's influence was 
also limited by its dented image. As uncertainty 
continues in the politically transitioning Southern 
Mediterranean, the EU has not been able to play a 
more effective role aside than calling upon the 
states to observe democracy practices through fair 
elections and upholding respect for human rights. 
 
1.2. Democracy and human rights are more 
important 
 
Contrary to the approach toward the Southern 
Mediterranean, the EU's stand on democracy and 
human rights has been seen by ASEAN as being too 
ideological. Possibly because of its limited role in 
the security dimension of ASEAN affairs, the EU has 
included democracy and human rights as part of its 
broader definition of security, terming it human 
security. It is a concept that ASEAN countries were 
initially hesitant to accept, seeing it as an opening 
to justify possible interference in their internal 
affairs. One of the first occasions in which these 
issues brought about disagreement between the 
two groups was ASEAN's reluctance to impose 
sanctions on China, as a response to the 1989 
Tiananmen incident. The Indonesian occupation of 
East Timor and human rights violations 
(particularly in the aftermath of the 1991 students 
protests) aggravated their differences. This 
continued until the accession of Myanmar to 
ASEAN in 1997. Myanmar’s record of human rights 
violation, and the detention of pro-democracy 
opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, along with 
many members of her party, the National League 
for Democracy, did not go down well with the EU. 
 
The Myanmar question, along with democracy and 
human rights concerns were problematic for both 
EU-ASEAN dialogue and Asia-Europe engagement. 
Myanmar's accession to ASEAN led to a stall in EU-
ASEAN meetings between 1997 and 2000. The EU 
excluded Myanmar in the 2nd Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) Summit in London 1998 inviting a threat of 
boycott from Mahathir Mohamad, the then 
Malaysian Prime Minister (Camroux, 2004: 13). EU-
ASEAN dialogue was only restored at the 13th EU-
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Vientiane in 
December 2000. Although the biennial Asia-Europe 
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Meeting (ASEM) Summit progressed without 
disruption, these issues remained contentious for 
both dialogue partners.  ASEAN ministers 
boycotted the Asia-Europe Economic Ministerial 
Meeting in Rotterdam in September 2005 after 
their Dutch hosts refused to grant visas to any 
Myanmar leaders and senior military officers4.  
 
For more than a decade, ASEAN looked upon the 
EU, given its stand on democracy and human rights, 
as an inflexible actor lacking sincerity in 
strengthening EU-ASEAN partnership.  The EU's 
demands on ASEAN for stricter adherence to 
democracy and human rights were only taken at 
face value.  However, as ASEAN embarked on its 
own community-building efforts after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the EU’s interests in supporting 
these efforts resulted in a more pragmatic 
approach towards ASEAN.  
 
The EU was also conscious that it should not allow 
the Myanmar question to hinder the progress of its 
dialogue with ASEAN. The publication of the policy 
paper on “A New Partnership with Southeast Asia” 
July 2003 reflected this pragmatic side of the EU's 
engagement with ASEAN. ASEAN's eagerness to 
regain international recognition and legitimacy 
after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis also meant 
that it had to be more forthcoming in its continuing 
engagement with the EU. 
 
The announcement of the establishment of the 
ASEAN Charter at the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala 
Lumpur in December 2005 confirmed ASEAN’s 
commitment to deepen integration.  The 
democratization of Indonesia, the largest member 
state of ASEAN, in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, compelled ASEAN to recognize the need for 
democracy and adherence to human rights 
principles. In 2008, the ASEAN Charter entered into 
force, serving as a blueprint towards further 
institutionalization, and the rule of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 ASEAN was represented by senior officials instead. 
2. Taking Stock of EU's group-to-group 
dialogue and partnership - what have been 
achieved so far? 
 
Two broad objectives guide the EU's group-to-
group dialogues – firstly, to achieve the political 
objective to strengthen democracy and human 
rights for global peace and (human) security; and 
secondly, to foster economic development through 
economic integration and shared prosperity. The 
EU relies primarily on economic incentives to 
motivate its partners in pursuit of these common 
goals. However, the effectiveness of this strategy 
was compromised by its inconsistent application in 
the Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN, which 
therefore engendered different dynamics and 
outcomes. 
 
2.1. Are they far from achieving their economic 
goals? 
 
At the inception of these two partnerships, the EU 
was regarded as both an aid donor and an export 
market for its two dialogue partners. For the 
Southern Mediterranean, this view remains 
unchanged until today, because their economies 
continue to rely heavily on the EU. Initially, the EU 
was optimistic about the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership and had set ambitious goals like 
establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
by 2010. That, however, has not materialized.  
 
Meanwhile in the early 1990s, economic 
stagnation and global competition forced the EU to 
reconsider ASEAN as an economic partner on equal 
footing because of the region's economic 
dynamism. Although ASEAN’s economic prowess 
was called into question when the Asian Financial 
Crisis hit the region, ASEAN's swift recovery and 
integration into the greater East Asian region still 
made it an attractive economic partner for the EU. 
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Graph 2.1.1. Annual average trade growth (1999-2012) 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and UNCTAD Statistics. 
 
 
Graph 2.1.2. EU's interregional trade relations, 1999 - 2012 (in EUR billion) 
 
Euro-Mediterranean      EU-ASEAN 
 
Source: Author's own elaboration and calculations,  
UNCTAD Statistics and European Central Bank 
Graph 2.1.3. EU's extra-regional trade trends by partners and share, 1999 - 2012 (% of EU's total trade) 
 
 
Source: Author's own elaboration and calculations, and UNCTAD Statistics. 
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The EU's economic relations with the Southern 
Mediterranean and ASEAN have indeed deepened. 
By the end of 2012, Euro-Mediterranean trade was 
EUR 161 billion and EU-ASEAN's EUR 191 billion5. 
(See graph 2.1.1) Between 1999 and 2012, Euro-
Mediterranean trade grew at an average of 
approximately 8 percent per annum (p.a.), and EU-
ASEAN's 7 per cent6.  If not for the euro zone crisis, 
the two group-to-group trade volume would have 
grown faster7. However, the growth of the EU's 
group-to-group trade with the Southern 
Mediterranean and ASEAN did not keep pace with 
their partners' total trade with the world. In other 
words, they had limited impact on the trade 
dynamics of those other regions (See graph 2.1.1). 
 
The three groups play different roles to one 
another as trade partners. The EU is a net exporter 
to the Southern Mediterranean countries, but is a 
net importer to ASEAN. The Southern 
Mediterranean region's chronic trade deficit with 
the EU totaled EUR 25 billion by the end of 2012, 
which accounted for approximately 30 to 40 per 
cent of its total trade deficit with the world8. The 
European market is therefore important for the 
Southern Mediterranean to improve its trade 
terms with the EU. Conversely, the EU's trade 
deficit with ASEAN compelled it to push for more 
export to the latter. In 2012, ASEAN enjoyed a 
trade surplus of EUR 29 billion with the EU, which 
is more than its total trade deficit of EUR 13 billion 
with the world. (See graph 2.1.2) 
 
The magnitude of the role the three groups play as 
trade partners is also diverse. The EU is by far an 
important trade partner to the Southern 
Mediterranean and ASEAN, but the opposite does 
not hold true. The Southern Mediterranean and 
                                                        
5 Values as reported end-2012, and figures were converted from 
USD to EUR based on the European Central Bank Annual Average 
Exchange Rate. The value “billion” refers to a thousand million. 
6 Total trade is the summation of export and import. Figures based 
on author's own calculations using data extracted from UNCTAD 
Statistics. 
7 Between 1999 and 2008, Euro-Mediterranean total trade grew at 
an average of 10.50 percent p.a. And EU-ASEAN's at 8.30 percent. 
Thereafter, between 2008 and 2012, the growth rates fell to 5.29 
percent and 5.03 percent respectively. 
8 Figures based on author's own calculations using data 
extracted from UNCTAD Statistics. 
ASEAN contribute only marginally to the EU's trade. 
Between 1999 and 2012, the Southern 
Mediterranean and ASEAN accounted for less than 
2 per cent of the EU's total trade with the world, 
and this is likely in part a result of strong intra-EU 
trade9 and the growing importance of China and 
Russia in world trade. (See graph 2.1.3) 
 
In comparison, the trends of trade partner profiles 
of both the EU's regional partners showed more 
dynamism. Although the EU is still the Southern 
Mediterranean's largest trade partner, its share in 
the Southern Mediterranean's total trade with the 
world fell by 8 per cent between 1999 and 2012 
(See graph 2.1.4). This decline was compensated 
by the growing share of 10 per cent of the Arab 
League countries, China and India combined over 
the same period. Meanwhile, the EU only managed 
to maintain its position as ASEAN's third largest 
trade partner, with its share shrunk by 5 per cent 
as intra-ASEAN trade strengthened and the 
importance of other trade partners increased. 
Intra-ASEAN trade share grew by 3 per cent, 
China's by 9 per cent, and rest of the world by 8 
per cent. 
 
The asymmetric trade relations the EU has with its 
regional partners only confirms its position as the 
more important export market on which the 
partners still depend on. However, economic slow-
down at home and the weakening of traditional 
importers forced the EU to diversify its export 
market to court the flourishing, developing regions. 
The EU also faces competition from other 
countries and blocs pursing similar strategy. Sitting 
within a dynamic East Asian region, ASEAN is a 
strategic economic partner to the EU, but both 
blocs are also competing to attract trade from the 
East Asian powerhouses at the same time. 
Although the Southern Mediterranean is nowhere 
as dynamic as ASEAN, especially because of its 
current unstable political situation, the EU saw the 
need to increase economic influence in the region 
                                                        
9 EU's intra-regional trade accounts for more than 60 
percent of its total trade share. Meanwhile, EU-China trade has 
grown at an average of 18 percent p.a. between 1999 and 2012, and 
by end of 2012 it accounts for five percent of EU's total trade share; 
and that of EU-Russia was growing at 17 percent and accounts for 
four percent.  
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to establish neighbourhood stability. However this 
was also met with competition from oil-rich Middle 
East economies and resource-thirsty China, which 
the Southern Mediterranean countries consider 
less demanding in conditionality than the EU. The 
EU's aims to foster economic integration with 
these other regions have thus achieved little 
progress.
Graph 2.1.4. EU's regional partners' trade trends by partners and shares, 1999-2012 (% of total trade) 
 
Southern Mediterranean 
 
 
ASEAN 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and elaboration, and UNCTAD Statistics. 
 
 
The EU's foreign direct investments10 (FDI) into the 
Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN also expanded 
and were growing faster than in their bilateral 
trade. By 2011, the EU's FDI in the Southern 
Mediterranean amounted to EUR 172 billion and 
was growing at an average rate of 19.05 per cent 
per annum since 2002, and EUR 194 billion in 
ASEAN at 11.74 per cent. (See graph 2.1.5 and 
table 2.1.1) The EU continues to be the most 
important source of foreign capital for Southern 
                                                        
10 The term “FDI” used throughout this paper refers to total 
FDI which is the summation of FDI flow and stock, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
Mediterranean. The EU's FDI not only represented 
more than 76 per cent but also grew faster than 
the total FDI the Southern Mediterranean received 
from the world11. 
 
The EU is only one of ASEAN's largest FDI sources 
accounting for approximately a quarter of the total 
FDI the region received from the world 12 . Its 
growth was also slower than the total FDI ASEAN 
                                                        
11 The share of EU's FDI in Southern Mediterranean is based 
on author's own calculations using FDI data of year 2011 extracted 
from UNCTAD Stat and Eurostat, and exchange rate from European 
Central Bank. 
12 Ibid. 
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received from the rest of the world. Unlike the 
Southern Mediterranean, ASEAN's source of FDI is 
more diverse, as intra-ASEAN FDI grew and East 
Asian investments in the region expanded. 
 
The Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN were not 
priority destinations for the EU's FDI with each 
group accounting for less than 2 per cent of its 
total FDI outside the EU.  More than 40 per cent of 
the EU's FDI in the world is kept within the Union 
and another 40 per cent to other economically 
advanced countries.  The meagre share of the two 
regional partners in the EU's FDI is also likely in 
part a result of lower investment costs in their 
predominantly low value-added labour-intensive 
industries. Corruption and state-intervention in the 
regions only hinder business environment 
conducive for investments. 
 
Although trade and FDI are the most important 
aspects that define the EU's group-to-group 
economic partnerships, the discussion would be 
incomplete without considering development and 
financial aid, which remains an important element 
of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and, to a 
lesser extent, EU-ASEAN cooperation. Between 
1999 and 2010, the Southern Mediterranean 
received an accumulated amount of EUR 49 billion 
in financial aid from the EU representing 
approximately 41 per cent of the total it received 
from the world. Whereas, only 12 per cent of what 
ASEAN has received thus far in financial aid from 
the world comes from the EU of an accumulated 
amount of EUR 28 billion. 
 
Since the past decade, the EU's group-to-group 
economic relations have indeed deepened but 
have failed to produce more dynamism in 
economic growth and development. The 
partnerships did not improve on their bilateral 
regional economic integration. Instead they fell 
into disintegration as all three groups turned to 
others outside the partnerships to pursue 
economic expansion. In this sense, the EU's group-
to-group dialogues have made hardly any progress 
in meeting the economic goals.  
 
The Southern Mediterranean is still far from 
achieving any economic growth and development 
to be a partner on equal footing with the EU. The 
EU's economic relations with the Southern 
Mediterranean remain imbalanced and are still 
underpinned by a donor-recipient relationship. The 
extent of economic and political reforms needed in 
the Southern Mediterranean requires more 
political will and regional stability, and is beyond 
what the current EU-South Mediterranean 
partnership could provide. 
 
Table 2.1.1. EU's FDI in Southern 
Mediterranean and ASEAN 
 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, UNCTAD 
Statistics and Eurostat. 
 
Economic reforms in Morocco and Tunisia were not 
enough to compensate the dismal economic 
conditions in the rest of the Southern 
Mediterranean. Economic conditions in the 
Southern Mediterranean are bleak compared to 
other developing regions; rampant unemployment 
and dire socio-economic conditions led to uprisings 
across the region in 2011. The objective to 
establish the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
by 2010 did not materialize because it lacked 
credible actions and commitments. It was not until 
March 2013 that the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership was seen picking up when the EU and 
Morocco announced negotiations for a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement to begin in 
the ensuing weeks, and to be followed by that with 
Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia (European Commission, 
2013). 
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ASEAN’s rising economic prosperity has had 
minimal link to the intensification of the EU-ASEAN 
economic partnership. Rather it has been ASEAN's 
unilateral openness to trade and FDI, and by being 
in a dynamic economic region proximate to a rising 
Chinese market, that drove ASEAN's economic 
development. The EU recognized the opportunity 
and the importance of deepening its economic 
relations with ASEAN and came to regard it as an 
equal dialogue partner. Increasingly, the EU also 
sees ASEAN as an emerging regional economy of 
great potential that could contribute to the revival 
of EU’s economic health. 
ASEAN's increasing economic dynamism and 
potential attracts not only the EU but other 
competitors.  The EU, realizing the increasing 
importance of ASEAN, tried to catch up with other 
economic players in the region by launching an EU-
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 2007. This was 
however suspended in 2009 because of difficulties 
in crafting an inter-regional agreement with ASEAN, 
whose members’ economies are vastly different.  
The EU had therefore re-strategised and embarked 
on negotiations with individual ASEAN member 
states, beginning with Singapore.   
 
Graph 2.1.5. Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN inward FDI trends, 2002 - 2011 (in EUR billion) 
 
 
Southern Mediterranean 
 
 
ASEAN 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and elaboration, UNCTAD Statistics and Eurostat. 
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Like the EU, ASEAN faces competition from 
economic giants like China and India and realized 
the need to further integrate to create a 
comparable market size that would be attractive to 
potential economic partners.   Competition drove 
ASEAN to pursue a more EU-style integration. 
Lacking the resources to do so, ASEAN requested 
the EU's assistance to support its integration 
process and to establish an ASEAN Community by 
201513. The EU granted a total of EUR 12.2 million 
between 2003 and 2010 under the ASEAN-EU 
Programme for Regional Integration Support. 
Ministers from both groups expect the creation of 
the ASEAN Community to lead to the reopening of 
EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement talks in 2015 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2013). It is still too early to tell 
whether and how the EU-ASEAN partnership would 
actually benefit economically from a more 
integrated ASEAN and vice versa, but ASEAN can 
expect to gain from the EU's increased engagement.  
 
2.2. What about the political goals? 
 
Since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, 
the EU has not made any significant progress 
toward achieving the political goals to establish 
democracy and human rights protection in the 
Southern Mediterranean. One weakness of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership was its over-
optimism on the progress of Arab-Israeli relations 
after the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 that led 
to the setting of over-ambitious goals. 
 
Graph 2.1.6. EU's financial aid flows into 
Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN 
 
Source: Author's own calculations, AidData and 
European Central Bank. 
                                                        
13 ASEAN adopted the agreement in 2003 to create an 
ASEAN Community by 2015. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the EU 
was overwhelmed by a sense of insecurity. As a 
result, regional security and counter-terrorism 
became top priorities in its relations with the 
Southern Mediterranean. In addressing security 
issues related to migration and terrorism, the EU 
cooperated with former authoritarian regimes in 
the Southern Mediterranean without strong 
conditionality on human rights issues and the 
democracy agenda.  Partly due to this reason, the 
democracy and human rights situation in the 
Southern Mediterranean has essentially remained 
unchanged, and has even deteriorated in some 
cases 14. Although democratic transition is now 
underway in the Southern Mediterranean, the 
political situation in the region remains delicate. 
With protracted unrest in the Southern 
Mediterranean, the EU continues to heighten 
security measures to deal with waves of refugees 
and displaced persons. 
 
The Arab-Israeli conflict and the broader regional 
security problem are not the only factors hindering 
political progress of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. First, Euro-Mediterranean relations 
are marked by imbalanced bargaining power. The 
EU's obsession with security led to its mistaken 
application of its economic soft power strategy 
that instead allowed Southern Mediterranean 
governments, who often lack accountability, to 
continue drawing financial aid without regard for 
democracy and human rights.  
 
Secondly, without the prospect of EU membership, 
the EU is restricted by what it can offer to make its 
soft power strategy effective in exchange for their 
Southern Mediterranean partners' cooperation. 
The EU’s Southern Mediterranean partners do not 
see what greater benefits can be gained from a 
closer Euro-Mediterranean partnership, apart from 
the generous financial aid they are already 
receiving. Thirdly, a history of threats from their 
Southern Mediterranean partners to disrupt the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership perhaps reveals a 
                                                        
14According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 
2006-2012, the Southern Mediterranean's average score between 
was 4.39 (based on author's own calculations) that is ranged 
between authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Please see table A.2 in 
the Annex the details of the scores.  
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lack of sincerity and political will to deepen 
cooperation.  
 
Meanwhile, ASEAN saw the EU's approach to 
democracy and human rights as unhelpful toward 
engendering a stronger partnership. It was not 
completely because of the EU's pressure, but 
rather the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that catalyzed 
ASEAN’s search for a revised regionalization model 
and drove ASEAN to be more open to the EU's 
values and norms. The democratization process 
within ASEAN itself sparked in part by the fallout of 
the Asian Financial crisis also contributed to the 
more open acceptance in discourse on democracy 
and human rights. 
 
Although anti-democratic practices and human 
rights violation remain common in parts of ASEAN, 
the situation has improved. Today, ASEAN is ranked 
more democratic than the Southern 
Mediterranean15, but is still far behind the EU's 
standards.  ASEAN has also moved towards further 
institutionalization with the implementation of the 
ASEAN Charter in 2008. Despite criticisms of the 
human rights clauses as being toothless, the 
development of the ASEAN Charter was a 
commendable step given how its member states 
have always been reluctant to discuss any issues 
that could be seen as interference into the 
domestic affairs of its members.  ASEAN saw the 
institutionalization process as necessary for a more 
consolidated region to be more competitive on a 
global level. The ASEAN Charter also acts as a guide 
to establish an ASEAN Community in 2015. It is 
unclear if this is a result of the EU's economic soft 
power strategy, but ASEAN's path toward 
institutionalization is evidently driven by, what it 
saw in the EU model, the prospects of economic 
gain from greater integration. 
 
As ASEAN countries continued its own path 
towards greater political openness, including 
Myanmar which has since 2011 embarked on 
                                                        
15According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 
2006-2012, ASEAN's average score between was 4.76 (based on 
author's own calculations). Although, as Southern Mediterranean, 
its score ranges between authoritarian and hybrid regimes, it is 
assigned higher score for ASEAN practises more democracy. Please 
see table A.2 in the Annex the details of the scores. 
political reforms, the dialogue between the EU and 
ASEAN had become more focus on deepening 
economic cooperation for mutual benefit and 
strengthening political dialogue to support regional 
developments.  
  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Since their inception, the EU's group-to-group 
dialogues with the Southern Mediterranean and 
with ASEAN have certainly deepened but have not 
brought them closer to their respective goals. The 
EU's use of a common economic soft power 
approach produce diverse results because of its 
inconsistent  application across the two groups, 
due in part to the different priorities  as a result of 
different conditions emerging  from the impact of 
global and regional events. Different aspirations 
and priorities, and gaps in values between the 
three groups created many misconceptions and 
preconceptions that influenced the quality and 
outcome of the dialogues. 
 
The EU's concerns with democracy, human rights 
and security have created different group-to-group 
dialogue dynamics. The EU is eager to cajole their 
Southern Mediterranean partners to cooperate to 
maintain regional security, especially after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, rather than antagonizing them 
with demands to embrace democracy and human 
rights. However, the Arab-Israeli conflicts remain 
problematic for Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and 
hinder regional cooperation. The Southern 
Mediterranean partners' lack of political will, and 
the regional dynamics prevent it to act as a group 
to pursue common economic goals and hampered 
the effectiveness of EU's strategies to pursue a 
wholesome group-to-group dialogue. 
 
The option to pursue bilateral cooperation with 
individual countries further hampered the effort to 
foster greater Euro-Mediterranean regional 
integration. Euro-Mediterranean economic 
relations may have expanded but the partnership 
has neither strengthened regional integration nor 
significantly improved economic prosperity in the 
Southern Mediterranean region. Euro-
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Mediterranean economic relations are still trapped 
in the donor-recipient relationship.  
 
The Southern Mediterranean's failure to conform 
to democracy and human rights values led to the 
situation in which social uprisings broke out 
throughout the region, proving how little 
substance the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue had 
carried and how far it had been from achieving its 
economic and political goals. As political 
transformation takes place in the Southern 
Mediterranean, the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue 
has also came to a halt and is unlikely to make any 
significant progress in the short-term. 
 
The EU could afford to act more assertively on 
socio-political values and norms with ASEAN 
because of its geographical distance and lack of 
security threats. Democracy and human rights 
issues have caused some disruptions to EU-ASEAN 
dialogue, but it was not until after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis began to unveil socio-political 
weaknesses in the region that ASEAN became more 
receptive to the EU's values and norms. Although 
ASEAN's democracy and human rights record is still 
far from meeting the EU's standards, the situation 
has improved while the EU has also softened its 
stand and focused its efforts on the economic gains 
of a stronger partnership. 
 
The EU-ASEAN dialogue partnership has been 
stepped up in recent years.  The EU has actively 
support ASEAN’s integration and its impending 
institutionalization process. The prospect of 
returning to EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement talks 
in 2015 only affirms how much the group-to-group 
dialogue has developed. Unlike the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, the EU-ASEAN 
dialogue has brought substantial progress and 
results even though the impact has not always 
been direct or obvious. 
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ANNEX 
 
Table A.1. Selected report of (threat to) boycott of Euro-Mediterranean meetings 
Year: Events: 
1997 Syria threatened to boycott any meetings held in Arab territory involving Israel. 
2000 Syria to boycott Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers Conference in Marseille. 
2002 Lebanon and Syria boycott Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers Conference in Valencia. 
2003 Syria and Libya refused to attend the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers Conference in Valencia. 
2005 Arab Mediterranean states boycott the 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process Summit, except Palestine and Turkey. 
2008 Egyptian parliament threatened to boycott Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Meetings, and cut ties with it. 
2009 Arab Mediterranean states to boycott the 2nd Mediterranean Summit in Istanbul. 
2010 Turkey, Palestine and several Arab League Southern Mediterranean countries to boycott the 2nd Mediterranean Summit. 
Source: Author's own compilation. 
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Table A.2. Democracy Index: EU, Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN 
 
Region / Economy 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 
 Algeria 3.17 3.17 3.32 3.44 3.44 3.83 
 Egypt 3.90 3.90 3.89 3.07 3.95 4.56 
 Israel 7.28 7.28 7.48 7.48 7.53 7.56 
 Jordan 3.92 3.92 3.93 3.74 3.89 3.76 
 Lebanon 5.82 5.82 5.62 5.82 5.32 5.05 
 Morocco 3.90 3.90 3.88 3.79 3.82 4.07 
 Palestine 6.01 6.01 5.83 5.44 4.97 4.80 
 Syria 2.36 2.36 2.18 2.31 1.99 1.63 
 Tunisia 3.06 3.06 2.96 2.79 5.53 5.67 
Southern Mediterranean* 4.38 4.38 4.34 4.21 4.49 4.54 
        
 Cambodia 4.77 4.77 4.87 4.87 4.87 4.96 
 Indonesia  6.41 6.41 6.34 6.53 6.53 6.76 
 Laos 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.32 
 Malaysia 5.98 5.98 6.36 6.19 6.19 6.41 
 Myanmar 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 2.35 
 Philippines 6.48 6.48 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.30 
 Singapore 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.89 5.88 
 Thailand 5.67 5.67 6.81 6.55 6.55 6.55 
 Vietnam 2.75 2.75 2.53 2.94 2.96 2.89 
 ASEAN* 4.65 4.65 4.75 4.77 4.78 4.94 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Note: 
 1) Index for 2009 not available. 
2) Data for Brunei not available. 
3) Higher the score, more democratic the regime is. 
4) * Regional average. 
 
EUC Working Paper No. 18 
 
19 
 
Table A.3. Global Peace Index: Southern Mediterranean and ASEAN 
 
Region / Economy 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Algeria 2.29 2.28 2.33 2.45 2.30 2.28 
 Egypt 1.96 1.87 1.81 2.01 2.23 2.26 
 Israel 2.97 3.01 2.00 2.88 2.77 2.73 
 Jordan 1.83 1.86 1.87 1.83 1.86 1.86 
 Lebanon 2.67 2.61 2.53 2.55 2.44 2.58 
 Morocco 1.82 1.86 1.85 1.85 1.89 1.90 
 Syria 1.99 2.11 2.20 2.23 2.87 3.39 
 Tunisia 1.66 1.69 1.66 1.73 1.98 2.01 
Southern Mediterranean* 2.15 2.16 2.16 2.19 2.29 2.38 
        
 Cambodia 2.12 2.18 2.25 2.25 2.30 2.26 
 Indonesia  1.86 1.84 1.95 1.90 1.87 1.88 
 Laos 1.77 1.77 1.68 1.70 1.73 1.72 
 Malaysia 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.59 1.57 
 Myanmar 2.54 2.50 2.61 2.52 2.55 2.53 
 Philippines 2.37 2.40 2.52 2.51 2.39 2.37 
 Singapore 1.47 1.44 1.50 1.48 1.43 1.44 
 Thailand 2.32 2.40 2.44 2.29 2.40 2.38 
 Vietnam 1.73 1.76 1.79 1.74 1.74 1.77 
 ASEAN* 1.97 1.98 2.03 1.99 1.96 1.99 
 
Source: Author's own calculations and Institute of Economics and Peace. 
Note:  
1) Index for 2009 not available. 
     2) Data for Brunei and Palestine not availabl. 
3) Lower the score, more peaceful the state is. 
         4) * Regional average. 
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